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Abstract 
In this paper, I elaborate on the Strong Nuclear Theory of tropes and substances, which I have 
defended elsewhere, by my metatheory about formal ontology and especially fundamental 
ontological form. According to my metatheory, for an entity to have an ontological form is for it to 
be a relatum of a formal ontological relation or relations jointly in an order. The full fundamental 
ontological form is generically identical with a simple formal ontological relation or relations 
jointly in an order. Regarding generic identity, I follow Fabrice Correia and Alexander Skiles who 
consider it a form of generalized identity as distinguished from numerical identity. The SNT states 
that for any trope to have the full fundamental ontological form is for it to be strongly rigidly or 
generically (existentially) dependent individual simple part. Therefore the common dichotomous 
set-up of asking whether tropes are fundamentally rather properties than objects or vice versa is a 
non-starter to me in formal ontological terms. The elaboration of the SNT also supplies me with 
resources to answer the arguments against tropes by Douglas Ehring, Robert K. Garcia and 
Herbert Hochberg. Finally, I argue that non-fundamentally but necessarily, every trope is a proper 
part of a substance and concrete in the SNT. 
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Consider the rest mass of an electron and the equal rest mass of another electron. According to a 
metaphysical theory called “trope theory”, the rest mass of each electron is an entity numerically 
distinct from both the two electrons and the other rest mass. The rest masses are not numerically 
identical; they are tropes. Accordingly, tropes are routinely called “particular properties” or 
“particularized properties” in the metaphysical literature (e.g. Garcia 2016, 2). Especially 
introductions to metaphysics discuss tropes as such entities.1 This is intimately connected to the 
dichotomous approach to tropes that they have to be seen as either properties, objects (i.e. bearers 
of properties) or more similar to either of them (Maurin 2018, sec. 2.1). For example, David M. 
Armstrong famously calls tropes “junior substances” – hence more akin to objects than properties 
(1989, 115). 
In this paper, I argue that when one considers the basics of trope theory, one gets on the wrong 
track right from the start with this dichotomous set-up.2 The set-up is deeply misleading when one 
tries to understand what tropes fundamentally are. Here I use “fundamentally” in formal 
ontological terms that means, to a first approximation, the fundamental form of existence of tropes. 
I shall present the fundamental form of existence of tropes as it is represented by the Strong 
Nuclear Theory (“SNT”, for short) of tropes and substances by Markku Keinänen and me.3 The 
SNT states that the full fundamental form of existence of each trope, that is, its full fundamental 
ontological form is to be strongly rigidly or generically dependent (mereologically) simple 
individual part. Neither propertyhood nor objecthood is mentioned here. The same result should 
concern any trope theory as a bundle construction of objects. 
                                                 
1 Cf. Allen 2016, 39-40; Edwards 2014, 49; Effingham, Beebee & Goff 2010, 255. 
2 By “trope theory”, I refer to the trope-bundle theories of substances and objects, in contrast to their trope-substratum 
theories. “Trope nominalism” covers both of these. 
3 Keinänen 2011; Keinänen & Hakkarainen 2010; 2014; Hakkarainen & Keinänen 2017; cf. also Keinänen, Keskinen 
& Hakkarainen 2017. 
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The SNT distinguishes the ontological form of a trope from the ontological identification of the 
trope with a nature or character (Hakkarainen & Keinänen 2017). Each trope is an entity identified 
with a nature or character. Since the SNT involves the distinction between ontological form and 
ontology, it is construed in a specific metaphysical tradition I call “formal ontological”. Formal 
ontological tradition stems from the Logical Investigations (1900-1) by Edmund Husserl but it was 
initiated in analytic metaphysics by Barry Smith and Kevin Mulligan (Smith 1978; 1981; Smith & 
Mulligan 1983). The basic idea of the formal ontological tradition is that the primary subject 
matter of metaphysics is ontological form, which includes the membership of ontological 
categories. Formal ontology studies both. Ontological form provides a unique point of view to the 
other main branch of metaphysics, ontology, that studies existence questions such as whether there 
are abstract entities or properties, that is, members of certain putative categories. 
Nonetheless, no fully satisfying account of ontological form and its difference from being or 
existence has so far been put forward in the formal ontological literature. Therefore there is a dire 
need for a metatheory of formal ontology in which this deficiency is removed. Furthermore, the 
fully satisfactory account of ontological form has to include nowadays a sophisticated view of 
fundamentality and non-fundamentality, which are intensively discussed by metaphysicians and 
metametaphysicians (as is documented by Tahko 2018). 
Accordingly, the SNT as a formal ontology needs to be elaborated upon by my metatheory. This 
elaboration concerns especially fundamental ontological form and the elaboration is what I do in 
this paper. Therefore, I can mostly just assume the SNT and not defend its central tenets here. 
The paper has a six-part structure. To describe the fundamental ontological form of tropes in the 
SNT, first I have to go into a rather long discussion of my metatheory. That I will do in the first 
two sections of the paper. Then I shall apply my metatheory to the SNT in section 3, which leads 
me to argue in the subsequent section that the dichotomous set-up of properties, objects or more 
akin to either of them is a non-starter in the SNT when one is considering the fundamental 
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ontological form of tropes. In the fourth section, I also establish with the help of my metatheory 
that the arguments against tropes by Herbert Hochberg (2004), Douglas Ehring (2011) and Robert 
K. Garcia (2014b; 2015; 2016) fail. This section shows then the fecundity of the elaboration of the 
SNT by my metatheory. The fifth section discusses two non-fundamental ontological forms of 
tropes in the SNT: proper parthood of substances and concreteness. I wrap things up in the 
conclusion. 
1. Ontological Form as Distinguished from Being or Existence 
To distinguish ontology from formal ontology in a determinate manner, I have to make a clear and 
precise distinction between being and ontological form. Regarding being, I do not have to go into 
the several questions of it, such as whether it is to be expressed by a quantifier or predicate. 
Suffice it that I simply make two assumptions about being in this paper leaving room for more 
than one view of it. (1) “Being” and “existence” are both univocal. (2) I follow the mainstream 
view in analytic metaphysics and metaontology that “existence” and its cognates are 
interchangeable with “being” and its cognates (van Inwagen 2009). 
Let me introduce, for the theoretical purposes below, the technical primitive concept of character 
at this point: the character of an entity is what the entity is like. Paradigmatic examples of 
characters are qualities and quantities entities presumably are or have, such as shape and rest mass. 
So character covers both tropes, accidents, attributes or properties and is therefore a more general 
concept than all these.4 In principle, a character may be essential, necessary or contingent to an 
entity. Therefore, the concept of character here also differs from the concept of essence—whether 
essence is understood modally or non-modally. Characters of entities belong to the extension of 
the concept of being or existence in the metaphysical theories that are committed to the existence 
of characters, for example realism about property universals, mereological nominalism, class or set 
                                                 
4 As a consequence, being a bare particular/substance or haecceity is not a character. Rather, it is an ontological form. 
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nominalism and trope nominalism. The upshot is that being consists of entities, including their 
character – given there are any characters or entities have any character. 
The concept of ontological form, in turn, is a complex concept consisting of the concepts of being 
or existence and form. Of form, I have a relational account in terms of the concept of character-
neutral internal relation. Character-neutral relations are internal because they are not entities 
numerically distinct from their relata (“additional entities” in this sense). The relational terms 
occurring in statements about internal relations do not designate (name) any relational entity 
(Keinänen, Keskinen & Hakkarainen 2017, ch. 2). They only apply to the relata of the internal 
relation: their reference is divided. To say that books are numerically distinct is not to name any 
entity additional to the books. Rather, it is to apply numerical distinctness to the books. Yet the 
holding of internal relations of their relata may be in principle asserted by relational statements 
expressing propositions true of the relata, such as “the books are numerically distinc”. (Ibid.) So in 
this specific sense, the holding of internal relations is real: the books, for instance, really are 
numerically distinct. 
Character-neutrality is independence from what an entity is like. Thus, a character-neutral internal 
relation holds independent from the character of its relata. When its holding is asserted, the 
statement as such, even if true, does not say anything whatsoever about the character of the relata. 
Therefore, character-neutral internal relations are such internal relations whose holding is 
expressible by true relational statements that do not describe the character of the relata without 
further assumptions. Hence, I may initially say that the ontological form of entities is determined 
by their standing in character-neutral internal relations. 
To argue this, let us consider four examples that are typically discussed by contemporary 
metaphysicians: being numerically distinct from, depending ontologically on, being a whole of and 
being a proper part of. Each of these is relational: they are features that entities have in virtue of 
being related to something; for instance, x is a whole in virtue of being related to some entities, 
6 
 
that is, to its proper parts. These relational features of entities may also be tentatively characterized 
as ways in which entities exist: x exists as numerically distinct from y, x exists as ontologically 
dependent on y, x exists as a whole of y and z and x exists as a proper part of y. Thus, these four 
features may be said to be the relational ways of existence of entities – the existence of entities is 
their standing in a relation to something. 
Here we have “way” in the sense of “form”; in these examples we are speaking about the specific 
form of the existence of x. Therefore I may say that the relational way of existence of x is its 
relational form of existence. For example, the numerical distinctness of a book from other books is 
its relational way of existence, rather than its character. 
The four relational forms of existence above are character-neutral, which can be seen by 
considering the statements that x is numerical distinct from y, that x ontologically depends upon y, 
that x is a whole of y and z, and that x is a proper part of y. None of them, without further 
assumptions, describe the character of x, y and z at all. As such it does not tell us anything about 
the character of x, y and z that x is numerically distinct from y, that x ontologically depends upon y, 
that x is a whole of y and z or that x is a proper part of y. Therefore these are formal statements: 
they concern the relational form of existence of their relata. 
The etymological origin of "ontological" is in Greek ontos, which can be translated into the 
possessive form of “existence”. So a general concept that covers all these four typical examples is 
ontological form: standing in certain character-neutral relations. Being numerically distinct from, 
depending ontologically on, being a whole of and being a proper part of are ontological forms. 
Other plausible candidates for typical examples of ontological forms in different metaphysical 
theories are being numerically identical with, being a part of, being a member of, being an element 
of, instantiating, exemplifying, participating, modifying, characterizing and different types of 
depending ontologically on such as depending for its existence rigidly or non-rigidly on (cf. Tahko 
& Lowe 2015). 
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Let us follow the clue of these four typical, that is, paradigmatic examples. Since they are 
paradigmatic, they generalize: true relational statements about ontological forms do not say 
anything about the character of entities without further assumptions. Ontological forms of entities 
consist of or may be construed as their standing in character-neutral relations. Since the order of 
character-neutral relations might make a difference, the order is to be considered. Proper parthood, 
for instance, is asymmetric (and standardly dyadic). Furthermore, it is Lowe’s insight that 
ontological forms are better be considered internal rather than external relations on pain of a 
vicious infinite regress (2006, 80, 92, 111, 167). Therefore I can conclude that for an entity to have 
an ontological form is for it to be a relatum of a character-neutral internal relation or relations 
jointly in an order.5  
The “is” in the previous statement is neither predication nor numerical identity. It is “the is of 
generic identity”: (for an entity) to have an ontological form is generically identical with (for it) to 
be a relatum of a character-neutral internal relations or relations jointly in an order. So I need to 
introduce the notion of generic identity next. This notion will turn out to be crucial also for my 
account of formal ontological fundamentality and non-fundamentality, including the fundamental 
and non-fundamental ontological forms of tropes below. Therefore, generic identity needs to be 
elucidated although I assume it as a primitive notion. 
Generic identity is a form of generalized identity that is a newcomer notion in philosophy, 
although its plausible examples are familiar: for instance, “for an entity to be a bachelor is for it to 
be an unmarried adult male” and “for an entity to be a water molecule is for it to be an H2O 
molecule”. Groundbreaking work on generalized identity has been done by Augustin Rayo (2013), 
                                                 
5 As such, ontological form differs from the possible logical form; to a first approximation, ontological form concerns 
entities, whereas logical form concerns truths or truth-bearers qua true or false (cf. Smith & Mulligan 1983, 73). Thus, 
logical connectives such as negation and disjunction are not formal ontological although they might be character-
neutral. It is a different metaphysical question whether there are corresponding formal ontological concepts. 
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Øystein Linnebo (2014), who coined the term, Cian Dorr (2016), Fabrice Correia (2017) and 
Correia & Alexander Skiles (2017). 
I follow Correia and Skiles and consider generalized identity analogous to the familiar numerical 
or objectual identity (e.g. “Hesperus is Phosphorous”). Correia & Skiles (2017, 3) express 
generalized identity with an operator, ≡, indexed by one or more variables, which takes two open 
or closed sentences. Generic identity is generalized identity of the form “for an entity to be F is for 
it to be G” in the monadic case (Fx ≡x Gx), which can be generalized into polyadic cases that 
involve relational predicates such as character-neutral internally relational terms. Generic identity, 
just like objectual identity, is reflexive, symmetric and transitive. (Correia & Skiles 2017, 4, 8). It 
has transparent linguistic contexts concerning only metaphysical matters rather than their mode of 
presentation (Dorr 2016, 44; Correia & Skiles 2017, 4). 
The expressions flanking ≡ can be conjunctive (Correia & Skiles 2017, 2). Still Correia & Skiles 
(2017, 3) emphasize that a generic-identity statement as such does not commit us to the existence 
of conjunctive properties or facts, which someone might find metaphysically problematic. Unlike 
objectual identity, the terms of generic identity do not have to be entities or its sign’s flanking 
expressions designating, true or satisfied (Ibid.). For example, it may hold of “for an entity to be a 
bachelor” and “for it to be an unmarried adult male” even if there were no bachelors, that is, 
unmarried adult males.  
Generic identity allows for representational differences between the left-hand side and the right-
hand side of ≡, as well as in the objectual identity “Virginia Woolf is Virginia Stephen” (arguably 
these names differ in meanings). So representational asymmetry is possible and the right-hand side 
may be informative about the left-hand side. Thus, the generic identity of the ontological form of 
an entity with its standing in a character-neutral internal relation or relations jointly in an order 
may very well be symmetric and informative. 
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Since for an entity to have an ontological form is for it to be a relatum of a character-neutral type 
of internal relation or relations jointly in an order, the suitable term for these ontological forms is 
“formal ontological relation” (“FOR”, for short; cf. Smith & Grenon 2004, Lowe 2006, ch. 3).6 
Accordingly, true formal ontological relational statements do not tell us anything about the 
character of their relata without further assumptions. Rather, they describe the character-neutral 
relational way in which the relata exist. Hence, for an entity to have an ontological form is for it to 
be a relatum of a FOR or FORs jointly in an order. In Aristotelian realism, for instance, for an 
entity to have the ontological form of being a universal is for it to be a terminus of the FOR of 
instantiation. 
By contrast, neither indistinguishability, exact resemblance/similarity, (inexact) 
resemblance/similarity nor any of their opposites is a FOR. They are character-dependent internal 
relations. Their statements even without further assumptions tell us something about the character 
of their relata. Let us assume it is true that x exactly resembles y and we know it. This true 
statement as such says something about the character of x and y, namely, that they are exactly 
resembling; the statement could not be true without something being true of the character of x and 
y. 
On this basis, I am also able to draw a clear-cut distinction between formal ontological and other 
internally relational terms. Formal ontological terms are character-neutral internally relational 
terms, whereas other internally relational terms are character-dependent: they appear in statements 
that in themselves say at least something about the character of the entities to which they apply. 
Moreover, formal ontological terms are primitive if they cannot be non-circularly defined. 
Derivative formal ontological terms, in turn, may be non-circularly defined. It depends on the 
metaphysical theory, which formal ontological terms are primitive and which derivative. For 
                                                 
6 Therefore, generic identity is not a FOR since the terms of generic identity do not have to be entities, in contrast to 
internal relations such as FORs. 
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instance, “is a part of” is considered primitive and “is a proper part of” derivative (and dyadic) in 
the metaphysical theories following the standard axiomatization of classical mereology. 
2. Formal Ontological Relations and Formal Ontological Fundamentality 
The Types and Ground of Formal Ontological Relations 
If FORs are character-neutral internal relations, why do they hold of their relata if they do? Why 
do entities have ontological forms they have? To answer this question, I need to elaborate on the 
sense in which FORs are internal first. This involves drawing important distinctions between 
different types of FORs. 
Due to their character-neutrality, FORs cannot be internal in the “property conception of internal 
relations”, held by Armstrong (1989, 43), for instance, that grounds the holding of any internal 
relation in the character of its relata. FORs are internal by the “modified existential conception” of 
internal relations, for which I have argued elsewhere (Hakkarainen, Keinänen & Keskinen 2018, 
93-102; cf. Keinänen, Keskinen & Hakkarainen 2017, ch. 2). 
This modified existential conception elaborates upon Mulligan’s existential account, according to 
which the mere joint existence of the relata of an internal relation is sufficient and exhaustively 
necessary for its holding (1998, 344). Mulligan’s existential conception needs to be modified to 
cover a plausible key type of internal relations in metaphysical literature. Here we are speaking 
about the situation where the mere existence of the relata is jointly sufficient for the holding of a 
relation, but the existence of entities distinct from the relata of the relation is also necessary for its 
holding. Indeed, it is better to consider this kind of case an internal rather than an external relation 
in order to avoid worries about Bradley’s relation regress threatening the latter but not the former 
(Lowe 2006, 111; Hakkarainen & Keinänen 2016). 
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This type of case may be illustrated by qualitative and quantitative relations among objects in 
views that are committed to properties. Let us take exact resemblance of objects as an example. 
Assume for the sake of the argument that electrons are objects and the electron charge (-e) is their 
essential or de re necessary (particular or universal) property numerically distinct from the 
electrons. Independent of the details of the metaphysical description of this circumstance, the sole 
existence of two electrons is jointly sufficient and individually necessary for the holding of the 
internal relation of having the same charge as between the two electrons. Necessarily, if these 
electrons exist, then they have the property of –e charge and the same charge. Due to this 
sufficiency, there is no ontological need to reify the relation of having the same charge as into an 
external relation. However, the existence of entities numerically distinct from the relata, that is, the 
two electrons is also necessary for the holding of the relation. The existence of the property of -e is 
necessary for the holding of the relation of having the same charge as. The necessity basis for this 
holding includes the property in addition to the two electrons (other examples are provided by 
proper parthood (given certain assumptions) and Lowe’s FOR of exemplification below). 
To cover these important cases, the modified existential conception makes a tripartite distinction 
among internal relations. When this distinction is elaborated on by the concept of generic identity 
and applied to FORs for the present purposes, it reads as follows. In the first place, for the holding 
of proto FORs, the mere existence of their relata is jointly sufficient and individually necessary. 
Secondly, a distinction between derived FORs and basic FORs is partly put in terms of proto 
FORs: 
[DFOR]: Necessarily, entities a1, …, an stand in derived FOR R if and only if the holding 
of R of a1, …, an is generically identical with the joint holding of proto FORs holding 
between entities some of which are distinct from a1, …, an [a1, …, an are names of entities] 
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[BFOR]: Necessarily, entities a1, …, an stand in basic FOR R if and only if R is a proto 
FOR and the holding of R of a1, …, an is not generically identical with the joint holding of 
proto FORs holding between entities some of which are distinct from a1, …, an. 
The basic and derived FORs are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. All basic FORs are 
proto internal – for instance primitive (inexplicable) numerical identity for the holding of which 
the mere existence of a primitively numerically identical entities is sufficient and exhaustively 
necessary. A putative theoretical example of a derived FOR is Lowe’s exemplification between a 
substance (e.g. Dobbin the horse) and a universal property (e.g. warm-bloodness or whiteness) 
(2006, 40, 92-3, 95, 206). In the four-category ontology, its holding may be construed as being 
generically identical with the joint holding of 
(1) either instantiation between the universal property (e.g. whiteness) and a mode (being 
white) and characterization between the mode and the substance (e.g. Dobbin) 
(2) or instantiation between the substance and a kind (horse) and characterization between the 
kind and the universal property (Ibid.). 
If the holding of this exemplification is necessary to the existence of the substance and the 
universal property, it is a derived proto FOR. In the case that it is only contingent to them, then it 
is a merely derived FOR.  
Thus, among proto FORs, there is a further distinction between the basic and the derived. In order 
for a basic FOR to hold, there need not be any specific entities distinct from the relata (e.g. 
primitive numerical identity). Derived proto FORs hold of their relata in virtue of proto FORs 
holding between entities some of which are distinct from the relata. The existence of the relata of a 
derived proto FOR necessitates the existence of entities distinct from the relata. The necessary 
form of Lowe’s exemplification relation is a theoretical example of such a relation. Yet this 
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derived FOR is proto formal ontological because the existence of their relata is jointly sufficient 
and individually necessary for the holding of these relations. 
Consequently, the necessity and sufficiency basis for the holding of a FOR depends on the type of 
the relation. The mere existence of the relata of a basic FOR is both jointly sufficient and 
exhaustively necessary for its holding (e.g. primitive numerical identity). In the case of a derived 
proto FOR, the mere existence of its relata is jointly sufficient and individually but not 
exhaustively necessary for its holding. The existence of entities distinct from the relata is also 
individually necessary. The holding of the derived proto FOR is generically identical with the joint 
holding of some proto FORs that bring in additional necessary entities. These additional relata 
complete the necessity basis of the holding of the derived proto internal relation. Again, the 
necessary form of Lowe’s exemplification relation is a derived proto FOR. 
If a FOR is merely derived (like the contingent form of Lowe’s exemplification), then the 
existence of its relata is not jointly sufficient for its holding; the sufficiency (and necessity) basis 
needs to be supplemented by the existence of entities distinct from the relata. The holding of such 
a derived FOR is contingent upon the existence of its relata. This is made possible by the fact that 
the holding of the derived FOR is generically identical with the joint holding of some proto FORs 
that add relata entities. It is the joint existence of the relata of all these proto FORs that is sufficient 
and exhaustively necessary for the holding of the derived FOR. 
To explicate this distinction further, recall that a generic-identity statement does not involve any 
commitment to the existence of conjunctive properties or facts, which someone might find 
metaphysically problematic. In contrast to objectual identity, the relata of generic identity do not 
have to be entities or the expressions flanking ≡ designating, satisfied or true. Hence, the holdings 
of FORs can be generically identical with each other although FORs are not entities that the 
flanking expressions could designate – especially entities in the category of universal relational 
properties that are instantiated. Neither do FORs have to be particular relational entities of which 
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the flanking expressions are true (e.g. relational tropes). The generic identity of FORs is the 
sameness of really holding character-neutral relatednesses of entities. Note also that generic 
identity allows representational differences between the left-hand side and the right-hand side of ≡. 
Thus, the generic identity of the holding of a derived FOR with the joint holding of proto FORs 
may very well be symmetric and informative of the derived FOR. Furthermore, if generic identity 
is conjunctive, then the conjuncts can be individually more fundamental in some respect than the 
other side (cf. Dorr 2016, 43). 
By means of the tripartite distinction, I can answer the question with which I begun this section, 
why do FORs hold? Whether a FOR is basic, derived proto or merely derived, its holding boils 
down to the existence of some entities. Their existence jointly necessitates and is exhaustively 
necessary for the holding of the FOR. In the case of the basic FORs, these entities are the relata of 
the FOR. If the FOR is derived, there has to be at least one entity distinct from the relata that is 
necessary for the holding of the FOR. Depending on the fact whether this additional entity is only 
necessary or plays a part in completing the sufficiency basis for the holding of the FOR, the FOR 
is either derived proto or just derived. Be that as it may, the ground for the holding of a FOR 
consists only of the existence of entities, rather than their character. This is how it ought to be 
given my view that FORs are character-neutral internal relations. 
Of these de re modalities, one may in principle hold any of the following three alternative 
metaphysical views. Let me facilitate my expression and focus on the necessity of the holding of a 
basic FOR upon the existence of its relata. (1) One may defend the view that this necessity is 
reducible to the existence of the relata of the basic FOR in possible worlds, of which there are 
several accounts available in the literature (for a mapping of alternatives, cf. Divers 2002). (2) One 
may take the necessity in question as a primitive fact: it is just an inexplicable brute fact that the 
existence of the relata is sufficient for the holding of the basic FOR (e.g. primitive numerical 
identity). (3) One grounds the necessity of the holding of a basic FOR in the inexplicable formal 
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essence of its relata, or at least one of them. We can read Lowe holding this view (2012, 241-3). 
Although I am leaning towards the second, primitivist view, I do not want to take any firm stance 
on this issue in this paper. I simply want to point out that my view of the ground of the holding of 
FORs is available to the upholders of more than one modal metaphysics. 
By means of the notion of generic identity, I am also able to draw a further distinction among 
FORs, which is crucial for understanding formal ontological fundamentality. This distinction is 
distinguishing simple FORs from complex FORs. Simple FORs are FORs that generically identical 
only with themselves. Primitive numerical identity is a plausible example of a simple FOR. 
Complex FORs, by contrast, are generically identical with some generically different FORs 
jointly. A good theoretical example of such a relation is Lowe’s exemplification discussed above. 
The distinctions between simple and complex FORs and basic and derived FORs crosscut. Every 
simple FOR is basic (hence proto formal ontological) because it is generically identical only with 
itself. By contrast, not every basic FOR is simple; there hold both basic and derived complex 
FORs. The reason for this is simple: there can obtain a proto FOR whose holding between a1, …, 
an is not generically identical with the joint holding of some generically different proto FORs 
holding between entities some of which are distinct from a1, …, an. Rather, its holding between a1, 
…, an is generically identical with the joint holding of generically different proto FORs holding 
between a1, …, an: it is basic. So I distinguish between simple and complex basic FORs on the one 
hand and between basic and derived complex FORs on the other. 
Formal Ontological Fundamentality and Non-Fundamentality 
In the previous section, I argued that for an entity to have an ontological form is for it to be a 
relatum of a FOR or FORs jointly in an order. Consequently, for an entity to have a simple 
ontological form is for it to be a relatum of a simple FOR in an order, and for it to have a complex 
ontological form is for it to be a relatum of a complex FOR in an order. For example, on the 
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assumption that an entity is primitively numerically identical, it has the simple ontological form of 
being numerically identical. Primitive numerical identity is a simple FOR since it is basic and its 
holding is generically identical only with itself. 
Simple ontological forms are fundamental ontological forms because simple FORs are 
fundamental FORs. Simple FORs are basic and their holding does not consist of anything: their 
holding is generically identical only with themselves. Formal ontological fundamentality is being 
unconstituted in the sense of generic identity. Thus, for an entity to have a fundamental ontological 
form is for to be a relatum of a simple FOR in an order.7 The full fundamental ontological form of 
an entity is generically identical with a simple FOR or FORs jointly in an order.8  
I can illustrate this with primitive numerical identity again: primitive numerical identity is a 
fundamental ontological form of the identical entity, but not necessarily its full fundamental 
ontological form. Primitive substances in Lowe, for instance, bear other simple FORs than 
numerical identity to some entities, such as instantiation (1998, 169-73). 
The full fundamental ontological form does not have to be the full mere ontological form either. 
An entity may have the full fundamental ontological form and bear a derived FOR to something. 
For example, an entity can be fundamentally a part and numerically identical but bear the derived 
FOR of proper parthood to a whole that has two proper parts.9 In that case, being a relatum of the 
simple FORs of parthood and numerical identity does not exhaust the ontological form of this part: 
its ontological form is partly generically identical with the holding of the derived FOR of proper 
parthood. Therefore, I should say that the full ontological form of an entity is generically identical 
with a FOR or FORs jointly in an order. 
                                                 
7 Formal ontological fundamentality is not to be confused with the fundamentality of entities, which may be dubbed 
“ontological fundamentality”. As such, the possible fundamental ontological form of being a property, for instance, 
differs from the putative fact that some but not all properties are fundamental entities (Tahko 2018). 
8 Note that it might be possible that there is not any fundamental ontological form since there does not hold any simple 
FORs. “Gunky” formal ontology in which every ontological form is complex seems to be possible. 
9 The example denies holism because the part has primitive numerical identity and it could exist without the whole. 
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If the full ontological form of an entity involves a derived FOR (proto or not), the full ontological 
form is non-fundamental. Hence, for an entity to have a non-fundamental ontological form is for it 
to be a relatum of a derived FOR in an order. Any derived FOR is a non-fundamental FOR for the 
very reason that its holding is generically identical with the joint holding of generically different 
FORs that involve additional necessary relata entities. The sole existence of the relata of the 
derived FOR is not exhaustively necessary for the holding of the derived FOR – even if their 
existence was jointly sufficient. The holding of every derived FOR is constituted in terms of 
generic identity. The generically different FORs are then individually more fundamental and the 
ontological form of the relata of the derived FOR is at least partly generically identical with them. 
Therefore, the fundamental form of existence of these relata (if they have one), that is, the 
fundamental way in which they exist cannot be even partly generically identical with the holding 
of the derived FOR. 
To use the previous example of the whole with two parts again, the proper parthood of the first 
part is its non-fundamental ontological form. The mere existence of this part and the whole is not 
exhaustively necessary for the holding of proper parthood between them since the whole would not 
exist and proper parthood hold without the existence of the other part of the whole. So the holding 
of proper parthood between the first part and the whole is somehow derived from FORs that have 
the other part as a relatum (proper parthood is standardly considered dyadic). For the first part, 
bearing proper parthood to the whole is not something that this part fundamentally is in formal 
ontological terms. By contrast, the whole would not have any ontological form without the non-
fundamental ontological form of bearing proper parthood to two numerically distinct entities. The 
whole would not exist without the two parts existing. This whole is a non-fundamental entity in 
formal ontological terms (bearing in mind the anti-holism of the example). 
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3. Fundamental Ontological Form of Tropes 
Now I can apply my metatheory about formal ontology of the previous sections to the Strong 
Nuclear Theory of tropes, substances and the relation of inherence between them (recall, 
“SNT”).10 Ontologically, tropes are entities that are standardly identified with characters or 
natures: what tropes are like. Plausible examples of tropes or characters in scientifically informed 
metaphysics are determinate basic quantities: rest masses, charges and spin quantum numbers. 
These characters are “thin” or qualitatively simple: they do not have even aspects that would be 
numerically identical with them. They can also be indiscernible and numerically distinct; the 
ontological principle of the identity of indiscernibles does not hold true of tropes. 
In this paper, however, my focus is on the ontological form of tropes, their (relational) form of 
existence rather than their ontology. According to the SNT, there are two primitive FORs qua 
terms: numerical identity and parthood. They are not defined in the theory. One of the derivative 
FORs in it (i.e. FORs qua defined terms), numerical distinctness, is defined as the negation of 
numerical identity. Another derivative FOR, proper parthood is defined by numerical identity and 
parthood: x is a proper part of y =df x is a part of y AND x is not numerically identical with y. 
The third derivative ontological form is strong rigid (existential) dependence that is defined 
modally by the notion of existence, numerical identity and parthood. A contingent entity x is 
strongly rigidly dependent on a contingent entity y if and only if  
(1) it is not metaphysically possible that x exists and y does not exist 
(2) x and y are not numerically identical 
(3) y is not a part of x (cf. Keinänen 2011, 431). 
                                                 




This differs from strong generic (existential) dependence that is the fourth derivative ontological 
form in the SNT. Roughly, any contingent entity x of kind P is strongly generically dependent on 
some contingent entity y of kind R if and only if 
(1) it is not metaphysically possible that any x of kind P exist and no y of kind R exists 
(2) x of kind P and y of kind R are not numerically identical 
(3) y of kind R is not a part of x of kind P (Ibid.). 
The numerical identity of tropes is not only a primitive term but also their simple reflexive FOR in 
the SNT. The holding of the FOR of numerical identity of each trope is not generically identical 
with any different FOR. Since every simple FOR is basic, the only explanation for the holding of 
numerical identity of each trope is the mere existence of the trope. This involves that each trope is 
a unity (i.e. one or countable) and an individual. 
Another simple and basic reflexive FOR in the SNT is parthood that holds of every trope: each 
trope is a part. Consider any trope whatsoever and its sole existence is sufficient and exhaustively 
necessary for it being a part. This ontological form distinguishes tropes from modes in Lowe’s 
four-category ontology, for instance. Lowe denies that modes are parts (2006, 97). According to 
the SNT, however, no trope is a terminus of the defined FOR of proper parthood (i.e. a whole). 
The SNT states that tropes are mereologically simple (mereological atoms). 
The element that distinguishes the SNT from some other trope theories such as Campbell’s (1990), 
Ehring’s (2011, 98ff.) or Maurin’s (2011) view is that tropes are strongly rigidly or generically 
dependent (cf. Simons 1994). It is not possible that there is a trope without some entity 
numerically and wholly distinct from the trope existing. The defined but simple (hence basic) FOR 
of strong rigid dependence or strong generic dependence holds of every trope. The standard case in 
the SNT is that there is a group of mutually strongly rigidly dependent tropes: the nuclear tropes of 
a substance (more about this below). 
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In sum, according to the SNT the simple ontological forms of tropes are that they are strongly 
rigidly or generically dependent, individual entities (i.e. numerically identical unities) that are 
simple parts. As I argued above, for an entity to have a fundamental ontological form is for to be a 
relatum of a simple FOR in an order. Therefore the holding of each of these simple FORs is a 
fundamental ontological form of any trope. Their joint holding is generically identical with the full 
fundamental ontological form of any trope. Fundamentally, in formal ontological terms, tropes are 
strongly rigidly or generically dependent individual simple parts. This is their character-neutral 
relational way of existence, which will turn out to be a crucial result for responding to certain 
objections to trope theory in the next section. 
4. Applying the Fundamental Ontological Form of Tropes 
From this already, one can see that the dichotomy between objects and properties is not at all the 
right way to understand what tropes fundamentally are in formal ontological terms in the SNT, or 
any trope theory, contra, what for example Garcia and Maurin say about tropes. For instance, if 
one follows Armstrong and understands his talk of tropes as junior substances meaning that tropes 
are more akin to objects than properties, one gets on the wrong track right from the start. 
The formal ontological distinction between objects and properties presupposes some FOR holding 
between them. Objects are one relatum of this relation and properties the other relatum. In realist 
metaphysical theories about universals, this relation is instantiation, participation or 
exemplification, depending on the theory. In nominalist theories that are committed to the 
existence of properties, it is for instance class/set-membership, inherence, modification or 
characterization. 
The SNT is among such theories but it gives a reductive metaphysical analysis of the relation of 
inherence: inherence consists of other relations such as parthood and strong rigid dependence (cf. 
Keinänen’s paper in this collection and Fisher 2018). This is due to the point that the SNT, like 
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any trope theory, such as Maurin’s account (2011), is a bundle-theory of objects. For an entity to 
be an object is for it to be a terminus of inherence since for an entity to be an object is for it to be a 
bearer of properties. In the bundle-theories, objects are complex entities constructed by tropes (or, 
universals) and the holding of certain relations such as parthood and strong dependence or 
compresence (e.g. Campbell 1990, ch. 1; Maurin 2011; Fisher 2018). Therefore, not only 
objecthood but also inherence is in the analysandum in trope theories. So it would be viciously 
circular if inherence were one the relations in the analysans. Consequently, in trope theories the 
holding of the analyzing relations has to constitute the holding of inherence. Therefore, inherence 
is not a simple FOR in the SNT, or any trope theory, because it is incorrect to say that inherence is 
generically identical only with itself. 
Hence, it is not stated in the SNTas it ought not in any trope theorythat tropes are formal 
ontologically fundamentally properties or objects, or more akin to one than the other. One just 
cannot consider the fundamental ontological form of tropes in these terms when one considers 
trope theories. Rather, ontologically tropes are identified with thin natures and in the SNT, their 
full fundamental ontological form is to be a strongly rigidly or generically dependent individual 
simple part. The dichotomous question set-up of properties or objects or more akin to either of 
them is a non-starter from the point of view of the SNT – as it should be in any trope theory as a 
bundle account of objects. 
In order to argue against trope theory, Garcia (2016, 2) has recently introduced a distinction 
between module and modifier tropes. In terms of my metatheory of formal ontology, this 
distinction is based on the fundamental FOR of self-inherence. Module tropes are fundamentally 
self-inhering, whereas modifier tropes are not: 
“In this stronger sense [of module tropes], ‘particularizing a property’ involves 
ascribing objecthood to a property. Here, particularization involves converting a 
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shareable and singly characterizing property (an immanent [Armstrongian] 
universal) into a non-shareable and thinly propertied object: a module trope. So 
understood, the Slogan fixes on the concept of a module trope: a primitively, 
naturally, and thinly charactered object.” (Ibid.; emphases added) 
“Here, the Slogan fixes on the concept of a modifier trope: a non-shareable and 
non-self-exemplifying property.” (Ibid.; cf. 2016, 5; 2015, 138, 144, 148; 
emphases added) 
So take any F module trope and it just is F, but an F modifier trope is not F. Module tropes are 
fundamentally self-inhering thinly propertied objects while modifier tropes are not. 
Garcia’s distinction is also a non-starter in the SNT, or any trope theory. This distinction 
presupposes that inherence can be a simple FOR holding of tropes because self-inherence is 
presumed to be such a relation. However, I just argued above that as a trope theory, the SNT 
denies the formal ontological simplicity and hence fundamentality of inherence. Therefore 
Garcia’s distinction between module and modifier tropes does not apply to the SNT, or any trope 
theory. Garcia’s argument against trope theories that is based on this distinction does not hit the 
target at all (Garcia 2016; 2015; cf. Garcia 2014a, sec. 2). 
In addition to properties or objects, another putative ontological form typically associated with 
tropes is that they are particulars, in contrast to universal thin natures. This is not correct about the 
ontological form of tropes in the SNT. Particularity is not among the ontological forms of tropes in 
it. Formal ontologically, particularity is not theoretically needed for anything: it does not do any 
theoretical work. There is no contrasting class here because as a nominalist theory the SNT is not 
committed to the existence of universals. It is only in discussions with the realists that we can 
inform them that tropes are the subjects but not the termini of the FOR of instantiation, 
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participation or exemplification of the realists. However, the SNT cannot accommodate any of 
these FORs since each of them presupposes the existence of universals. 
Someone might object here that it does not presuppose universals to say that tropes are particulars 
because they can be indiscernible and numerically distinct. The principle of the identity of 
indiscernibles does not hold true of tropes. Therefore even a nominalist can hold that tropes are 
particulars; Williams (1986) and Ehring (2011, 35), for instance, put particularity in this way. 
My response to this possible objection is that my account of ontological form is not compatible 
with this characterization of the ontological form of particularity. Being indiscernible from 
(exactly resembling to many metaphysicians) is not a FOR since it is a character-dependent 
relation. The statement that x and y are indiscernible tells us, if true, something about the character 
of x and y even without further assumptions – namely that they are indiscernible and are of the 
same type or kind. Hence, when the formal ontological side of the SNT is put in terms of my 
metatheory of formal ontology, the SNT cannot accommodate Williams’ and Ehring’s 
characterization of particularity either. This does not mean, however, that it is false that the 
principle of the identity of indiscernibles does not hold true of tropes. On the contrary, the SNT is 
committed to the denial of this ontological principle although it is not considered a formal 
ontological principle in the SNT. 
My metatheory also undermines any argument against tropes that is premised upon the holding of 
indiscernibility, exact resemblance/similarity, resemblance/similarity or their opposite in respect of 
some ontological form. For instance, one might claim that the nuclear tropes of a simple substance 
in the SNT are exactly resembling with respect to particularity or strong rigid dependence. Ehring 
(2011, 182) and Garcia (2014b, secs. II-IV) are examples of such arguments in the literature. 
One of the premises of Ehring’s argument is that there are tropes that are exactly or inexactly 
similar “with respect to their particularity” (2011, 182). Garcia’s argument is based on the notion 
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of dependency profile: “A trope t’s dependency profile specifies all the distinct token and/or types 
of tropes on which t is (rigidly or generically) dependent.” (2014b, 169) If the dependency profile 
of a trope were in its character, then the SNT would deny it. According to the SNT, tropes do not 
depend for their existence because of their character. So the charitable reading of Garcia is that in 
the SNT, the dependency profile of a trope has to consist of the FORs of strong rigid and generic 
dependence that this trope bears. Of the dependency profiles, Garcia maintains that they “admit of 
qualitative differences and similarities” and goes on to argue against the SNT with that claim (Ibid. 
170 and secs. III & IV). Garcia’s argument against the SNT is then premised upon the statement 
that the FORs of strong rigid and generic dependence can stand in the relations of similarity and 
difference. 
Let us grant for Ehring for the sake of the argument that tropes have the ontological form of 
particularity although I could rebut his argument simply by saying that the SNT does not have to 
state that tropes are particulars. Proceeding with this assumption, I can respond to Ehring and 
Garcia that according to my metatheory, no entity bears indiscernibility, exact 
resemblance/similarity, resemblance/similarity or their opposite in respect of any ontological 
form. The reason for this is simple: these character-dependent relations can hold only among 
entities. However, ontological forms, that is, FORs are not entities in themselves; FORs are 
internal relations. Thus, ontological forms or FORs can stand in neither indiscernibility, exactly 
resemblance/similarity, resemblance/similarity nor their opposite. This undermines any argument 
that assumes such a standing – especially Ehring’s and Garcia’s lines of reasoning that take the 
putative ontological forms of particularity and strong rigid or generic dependence of tropes as their 
targets. 
Ehring (2011, 179-80) has another argument against standard tropes that are simple entities 
identified with thin natures or characters: they are not simple, pace the SNT. This argument is 
similar to Herbert Hochberg’s earlier line of reasoning (2004, 39; cf. Moreland 2001, 70-1; 
25 
 
Armstrong 2005, 310). A key premise in Ehring’s argument is that “arbitrarily different internal 
relations” must have distinct relata. The holdings of arbitrarily different internal relations vary or 
are realized independently from each other. Exact resemblance and numerical distinctness among 
standard tropes are arbitrarily different internal relations. Thus, they have distinct relata and no 
individual trope can be both exactly similar, numerically distinct and simple. The simplicity of 
standard tropes is refuted. (Ehring 2011, 177-80) 
Hochberg’s (2004, 39) a key premise is that the internal relations of exact similarity and numerical 
distinctness qua logically independent basic propositions cannot have the same truthmakers. If it is 
logically possible that any basic proposition is true and another false (and vice versa), then these 
basic propositions are logically independent. 
My metatheory supplies the SNT with resources to answer these arguments (cf. Hakkarainen & 
Keinänen 2017). The SNT can deny both Ehring’s and Hochberg’s key premises and therefore 
refute their arguments against simple tropes. Exact resemblance is a character-dependent internal 
relation, whereas numerical distinctness is a character-neutral internal relation, that is, a FOR. Yet 
their holdings can have numerically identical grounds. Let us assume that there are two 
numerically distinct exactly resembling tropes. As I argued above, the ground of their numerical 
distinctness is nothing but their existence. Ontologically each of these two tropes is identified with 
a character. So there holds no numerical distinctness between their existence and character; they 
are entities identified with the character that they are. Now, these two tropes exactly resemble 
because of the characters they are. Thus, the grounds of these tropes being numerically distinct and 
exactly resembling are not numerically distinct. These two internal relations do not have to have 
numerically distinct relata or truthmakers qua propositions. 
Nonetheless, numerical distinctness and exact resemblance among tropes in general can be 
arbitrarily different internal relations or their propositions logically independent. Let us consider 
the former first. The holding of any exact resemblance depends on the character of its relata. By 
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contrast, the holding of the FOR of numerical distinctness between tropes in general does not 
depend on the characters that the tropes are. So tropes may or may not be numerically distinct 
independent from the characters they are. Tropes of exactly similar or different character can be 
numerically distinct. The holdings of numerical distinctness and exact resemblance can vary or be 
realized independently from one another, which is a sufficient condition for them being arbitrarily 
different. Furthermore, this independence of variation and realization may also be construed as 
logical in nature. Thus, numerical distinctness and exact resemblance among simple tropes are also 
logically independent as propositions. Hence, they are both logically independent qua basic 
propositions and arbitrarily different internal relations. As was seen just above, these logically 
independent basic propositions do not have to have distinct truthmakers or arbitrarily different 
internal relations distinct relata. Thus, the SNT denies Ehring’s and Hochberg’s key premises and 
hence refutes their arguments. 
5. Of the Non-Fundamental Ontological Form of Tropes 
According to the SNT, tropes have also derived ontological forms. Let us take two examples 
although the main topic of this paper is not the non-fundamental ontological forms of tropes. In the 
SNT, every trope is necessarily a proper part of a substance: there are no “free-floating tropes”. 
To expound the constitution of the relation of proper parthood between tropes and substances, let 
us first facilitate the presentation and take the example of an arbitrary minimal substance in the 
SNT. Such a substance is a simple substance since it does not have parts that are substances; it has 
only two trope parts, say, a rest mass trope and a charge trope. It is a minimal substance. Let us 
also assume that the two tropes are mutually strongly rigidly dependent: neither of them can exist 
without the other. They are the only tropes and nuclear tropes of the minimal substance. 
Consequently, also their plurality has to exist given the contingent existence of one of them. 
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By the Conditioning Principle adapted from Simons (1987, 322), the plurality of these two tropes 
is not existentially dependent on any other entity than the rest mass trope and the charge trope. 
This principle states that necessarily, if plurality x is such that every dependent entity of it (its 
element) has all the entities on which the entity depends also in x, then x is not dependent on 
anything else than its elements. In other words, the elements of x satisfy its “existential needs”. 
Thus, the plurality of the two tropes is a strongly rigidly independent entity: it does not depend for 
its existence on any entity that is wholly distinct from it, that is, that does not share parts with it. 
The plurality depends for its existence only on the rest mass trope and the charge trope. Since the 
definition of strong rigid dependence rules out dependence on parts, the plurality satisfies the 
condition of being a substance in the SNT: it is a strongly rigidly independent entity. Hence, the 
consequence is that here we have actually an individual. 
Regarding the relation of proper parthood holding between the arbitrary minimal substance and its 
two mutually rigidly dependent trope parts, the upshot is that the holding of this relation from one 
of the tropes to the substance requires the existence of the other trope. This result generalizes in 
the SNT. Thus, proper parthood from any trope to a simple substance is a derived FOR (note that it 
is standard to consider proper parthood dyadic). 
It follows that this FOR of proper parthood between a trope and a simple substance is neither a 
simple nor a fundamental ontological form of any trope in the SNT, in contrast to the parthood 
reflexively holding of tropes. Since the trope is an arbitrary trope in the SNT, no trope is 
fundamentally a proper part of a substance. Proper parthood between them is a neither simple nor 
basic FOR.11 
Connected to this, recall that Armstrong claims that tropes are junior substances. If this involves 
that tropes have the ontological form of independence, it is not correct in the SNT either. Tropes 
                                                 
11 This also means that being a substance is not a fundamental ontological form in the SNT. 
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are strongly rigidly or generically dependent entities, whereas even simple substances are strongly 
rigidly independent entities. 
Concreteness is another derived ontological form of each trope. According to the SNT, every trope 
is located in space-time. This entails that no trope is abstract, that is, an entity not having even a 
temporal location. Assuming that concreteness is an ontological form, some FOR has to hold 
between each trope and space-time. What this FOR is depends on the theory of space-time.12 Yet it 
must be a derived FOR because the mere existence of an arbitrary trope and space-time is not 
exhaustively necessary for its holding (it may be sufficient though). At least the existence of a 
relational trope or space-time point is required. Hence, the ontological form of tropes being 
concrete is derived. 
The derived status of concreteness and the proper parthood of a substance does not mean, 
however, that no trope is necessarily concrete and a proper part of a substance. On the opposite, 
the SNT states that every trope is necessarily a proper part of some simple substance. Let us take 
nuclear tropes as an example (bracketing the limiting case of singular nuclear tropes). Necessarily, 
if there is an arbitrary nuclear trope, then there is another trope or there are other tropes and these 
tropes are strongly rigidly dependent on each other. By the Conditioning Principle, it follows that 
the arbitrary trope is also necessarily a proper part of a simple substance. Equally, necessarily for 
any arbitrary trope, the trope exists at a spatio-temporal location. Proper parthood between an 
arbitrary nuclear trope and a simple substance and the concreteness of every trope are derived 
proto FORs in the SNT. It is necessary to any trope that it is a relatum of these two FORs. 
                                                 




I have argued that according to the Strong Nuclear Theory, the full fundamental ontological form 
of every trope is to be a strongly rigidly or generically dependent individual entity that is a simple 
part. In these formal ontological terms, each trope is non-fundamentally but necessarily a proper 
part of a simple substance and concrete. The proper parthood and concreteness of every trope is 
one of its derived ontological forms. Ontologically, the SNT identifies each trope with a thin 
character. It is also rather an ontological than formal ontological feature of each trope in the SNT 
that the principle of the identity of indiscernibles does not hold true of it. 
This summarizes the way in which I put the SNT in terms of my metatheory of formal ontology 
and its difference from ontology. Ontology studies existence question such are whether there are 
properties from the unique point of view provided by formal ontology. The core subject matter of 
formal ontology is ontological form, of which I have a relational account. My account employs the 
notion of generic identity, which is a form of generalized identity distinguished from the familiar 
numerical or objectual identity. 
In terms of generic identity, for an entity to have an ontological form is for it to be a relatum of a 
formal ontological relation or relations jointly, that is, character-neutral internal relation or 
relations jointly in an order. Internal relations actually hold of their relata although they are not 
entities numerically distinct from the relata. The holding of internal relations can be in principle 
asserted by relational statements. The statements about character-neutral internal relations do not 
say anything about the character of the relata of the relations without further assumptions (contra 
character-dependent internal relations). The character of an entity is what the entity is like. In 
addition to entities themselves, their possible characters belong to the extension of the concept of 
existence or being, which I assume to be interchangeable univocal concepts. 
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In the fourth section, I showed that putting the SNT in terms of my metatheory is fecund because it 
gives resources to answer the arguments against tropes advanced by Douglas Ehring, Robert K. 
Garcia and Herbert Hochberg. These arguments do not distinguish the formal ontology of tropes 
from their ontology. Their argumentative gap lies in overlooking this distinction. 
I distinguish fundamental ontological form from the non-fundamental by the distinction between 
simple and derived formal ontological relations that builds upon a tripartite distinction among 
proto, derived and basic internal relations. For an entity to have a fundamental ontological form is 
for it to be a relatum of a simple formal ontological relation in an order. Every simple formal 
ontological relation is basic. The mere existence of the relata of a simple formal ontological 
relation is jointly sufficient and exhaustively necessary for the holding of the relation. It is also 
simple because the holding of such a relation is generically identical only with itself. So the 
holding of a simple formal ontological relation is not constituted in the sense of generic identity. 
By contrast, for an entity to have a non-fundamental ontological form is for it to be a relatum of a 
derived formal ontological relation in an order. The holding of a derived formal ontological 
relation is, roughly, generically identical with generically different formal ontological relations 
that jointly hold of entities some of which are numerically distinct from the relata of the derived 
formal ontological relation. 
Applying my metatheory to the SNT and trope theories establishes that the typical dichotomous 
set-up of asking whether tropes are rather properties than objects is a non-starter in the SNT. The 
same is correct of the talk about tropes as particular properties or particularized properties when 
one understands this talk as concerning the fundamental ontological form of tropes. First, the SNT 
does not need particularity theoretically for anything. Secondly, being a property, object or 
something more akin to either presupposes the relation of inherence that is not a fundamental 
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